The
offices of the governing party were set ablaze in Ankara and Izmir.
Demonstrations and fighting with police also took place in Adana, Antalya and
many dozens of other cities and towns, in as many as three quarters of Turkey's
provinces
In the
clashes with the police, the assaults and counter-assaults, countless women
were in the forefront of the fighting, relishing a chance to battle for what
they see as a clash over what kind of world they will live in. There were women
in sun dresses holding out their arms to mockingly gesture "Bring it
on" to the riot police; women in thin tank tops, their hands wrapped in
rags so that they could grab tear gas canisters; many young students in jeans,
some wearing head-scarves and a few with Occupy face masks as well; and other
women of all ages and classes.
Some
women fought; some milled around like most people; some brought fresh bread and
tea to keep everyone going; some went home and banged out the rhythm of chants
in their neighbourhoods. The police, who were spraying people in the face with
streams of pepper gas and firing bone-breaking, flesh-penetrating baton rounds
at close range, displayed a particularly violent hatred for women. Photos on
the Web show one or another defiant woman caught in a crossfire of gas-loaded
water cannons strong enough to cause serious injury.
Few
women entered into this fray without an awareness of the special dangers, but
perhaps their enthusiasm for symbolic and physical confrontation stems from a
feeling that they are a central target of Erdogan's programme. He tried to ban
Caesarean section births and put restrictions on abortion, not so much in the
name of religion but because, as he once opined on TV, "Turkish
women" (meaning ethnic Turks, not the country's minorities) should have
more babies. In the blatantly patriarchal climate Erdogan has helped foster,
honour killings, long a plague in Turkey, have risen sharply, with little
prosecution. This participation by women is not just an interesting and
positive feature. It is one of the characteristics that is best about this
movement.
Another
of its characteristics is that it is an outpouring of opposition to the
government by many tens of thousands of people, while the opposition political
parties have not been playing a directing role. The focus is on the government
of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Many protesters demand that he listen
to the people. Others, from the first, called for his resignation and
increasingly his head. But this is more of a massive convergence of diverse
streams than a political coalition.
There
is a general unease with Erdogan's recent speed-up of the Islamization of
Turkey's society. Recently the world-renowned pianist Faisal Say was tried and
convicted for a Tweet comparing the Moslem vision of heaven to a house of
prostitution. A young couple got in trouble for kissing on the Istanbul metro.
The sale of alcohol was limited, and Erdogan declared that only alcoholics
touch it. This was understood as a slap at Ataturk, who made a political point
of drinking as part of establishing a Westernized, non-religious state and
society.
Angered
by all this, in a residential neighbourhood near Taksim Square a very elderly
woman and the much younger woman from the countryside who cleans her apartment
marched out of their apartment building arm in arm, bought some beer and sat
down on a bus stop bench. They sipped a little and held their cans in the air
so that the world could see their solidarity with the protesters who chanted,
"Thanks for banning alcohol, now we've
come to our senses." People also held mass kiss-ins.
Now in
the streets there seems to be an enormous desire for unity. In a city torn by
deadly football rivalries, there were marchers wearing the t-shirts of one team
and the scarves of their bitter enemies. A widely-posted photo shows a trio of
young men making the hand signs of the fascist Grey
Wolves, the secular Kemalists and the leftists. There were gay rights banners
and a few portraits of Ibrahim Kaypakayya (the founder of the Maoist movement).
The main opposition party, the deflated CHP that considers itself Ataturk's heir,
has not played much of a role so far. Many protesters voted for Erdogan and
many people are sick of all the political parties. But the most common
political symbols have been badges, banners and portraits of Ataturk. While
Kurds as individuals are participating and there are occasional banners and
chanting in support of the PKK and its leader Abdullah Ocalan, in general the
question of the liberation of the Kurdish people has been lost in a sea of
Turkish flags.
Some of
the protesters are religious believers who feel that Erdogan is
instrumentalizing their faith. Some are opposed to religious rule in general.
Most seem to consider themselves secular. But this secularism itself covers
contradictory trends. Kemalism (as Ataturk's ideology is called) has always
been reactionary. His vision of the "unity" of Turkey has always
meant oppression of the Kurds and other minorities who make up a large part of
the population. When marchers in Istanbul chant, "We are Turks, not
Arabs" – one of Ataturk's signature ideas, hitching Turkey to the Western
powers instead of the Arab world – this kind of opposition to Islamism is
poisoned with Turkish chauvinism and reactionary ambitions for regional
domination as a willing junior partner to the Western imperialist powers.
While
opposing a religious state, Ataturk's heirs repressed non-Sunni schools of
Islam (such as the Alevis) and gave state support to the Sunni religious
establishment. Although Ataturk banned the public wearing of head-scarves for
women and promoted what are perceived as Western values in other ways, the
Turkish state he founded has both relied on the traditional mould of patriarchy
and promoted a more Westernized (and sometimes decadent) form.
In
fact, the most fervent followers of Ataturk have been Turkey's generals, who
kept their country under an iron heel for much of the late twentieth century
with the blessing of the imperialist powers. The complaints emanating from
Washington and other Western capitals about Erdogan's "authoritarian turn"
have to be seen in that light. Ironically, some of the"leftist"
parties now in the streets against Erdogan and going along with the Kemalists
gave him their support or assent until now, with the excuse that "He saved
us from the generals."
This
kind of confused thinking is especially dangerous in a confusing situation. The
political and class coalition around Erdogan is fraying, although not
necessarily irreparably. As an informed observer explained it, Erdogan became
prime minister with the support of the Tusiad, the association of Turkey's most
powerful imperialist-dependent capitalists, the heads of holding companies that
own big banks and monopolize industrial sectors such as textile, appliances and
other export items and construction. At a time when globalization was forcing a
restructuring of Turkey's ruling class and the traditional parties had become
ineffectual, his task was to repair the power structure and broaden its social
base by bringing in newly arising, traditional, Islamic-minded rural
capitalists who like to call themselves the "Anatolian tigers" as a
signal of their aspirations for wealth and power. He also
appealed to the pious rural population and those coming into the cities.
Erdogan
promoted himself as a tough guy from the slums of Kasimpasha, not far from
Taksim. But his political success with sections of the ruling class was based
on the fundamental promise not to radically change anything. His way of dealing
with the urban poor was a reactionary populism based on a kind of cultural
revenge against the "Tarabyav", people from an opulent, secular
Istanbul quarter. This was combined with "the Kurdish card," his
long-term attempts to bring the PKK and Kurdish capitalists under his wing,
simultaneously mitigating the "Kurdish problem" and acquiring an ally
with influence among an important segment of the rural and urban poor.
However,
the headlong economic development under his leadership has brought political
changes. There is a question as to whether he still feels a need for the
support of the lesser, "Anatolian" newly rich, and a feeling that his
programme is meant to favour the country's biggest financial forces and
encourage the kind of "bubble" speculation that may take Turkey down
the path of Greece. Many people at various levels are worried that Erdogan's
policies regarding Syria will pull his country into a regional ethnic and
religious civil war. It can be said with certainty that many people at the top
are worried that he is endangering rather than solidifying the ruling
coalition.
To be continued...
Pix from Voice of Russia.
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