“No poor bastard
ever won a war by making ‘PowerPoint presentations’. You win a war by blood and
guts, and above all, by mastering the art of warfare,” says the chief of a special
force fighting Naxalites, on the strategy and unified policy to neutralise
India’s biggest internal security threat.
An anti-Naxal operation forceIt was a bloody
Saturday for the Special Task Force’s (STF) Platoon Commander Shankar Rao when
his 61-personnel team, armed and prepared for anti-Naxal operations, was caught
in an open triangle ambush near Pidmel-Polampalli area of Sukma district in
Chhattisgarh on April 11. Surprised by the attack from three flanks, the STF
jawans did their best to come out of the ambush; ultras, however, were able to
inflict heavy damages, by killing seven jawans, including Rao, and injuring 11.
This was just the beginning. For the next three days,
Maoists, considered the biggest internal security threat, carried out four
deadly attacks, killing four more policemen and a BSF jawan in the state. It
was a tragic reminder that Naxalites still retain striking capabilities and can
hit at will—despite our daily political rhetoric.
BLOODY BATTLEGROUND
The attacks in Chhattisgarh triggered a raging debate in
security establishments on whether anti-Naxal offensives have been a massive
failure. And whether a combined force of state police and Central paramilitary
is in a position to tackle the insurgents, operating in 76 districts across 10
states.
Let us face the facts. The government data in the past
decade (2005-2015) throws horrific figures about the state of India ’s
anti-Naxal operations: 4,510 people—1,753 jawans and 2,757 civilians—were
killed by Naxalites. During the same period, however, security forces killed
2,193 Naxalites. This means that on an average, the Naxalites killed
about two persons for every one they lost in the battlefield. They also
snatched away 536 sophisticated weapons from the security forces. Now, what is worrisome is the ruthless killing of police
informers. According to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), in the first three
months of 2015, around 19 informers, responsible for gathering and
disseminating human intelligence (HUMINT), were killed.
Between 2010 and 2014, the figure was 879. The data is
self-explanatory and raises a pertinent question: Has the nation made any dent
on the Naxal movement? A senior IPS officer in his book notes: “We are fighting
the war on their (Naxalites) terms, not our terms.” Pointing out the reasons
for anti-Naxal operations not producing any worthwhile results in spite of huge
investments and heavy deployment, he says, “The tragedy is that vast resources
have been placed at the disposal of those who are simply not fit to command—who
do not have slightest idea of combat.”
Although anti-Naxal operations are coordinated efforts of
Central and state police forces, the former has deployed over 108 battalions
(134,667 personnel approx.)—83 battalions of the Central Reserve Police Force
(CRPF), 15 battalions of the Border Security Force (BSF), five battalions each
of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) and Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) in the
Naxal-hit areas. The states have deployed an estimated 30,000 police personnel.
If we combine the total strength, 164,667 pair of boots are on the ground to
crush an estimated 10,000-15,000 armed Naxalites—10 jawans to kill one
Naxalite.
A senior police officer from Chhattisgarh says the
deployment of forces has increased but effectiveness is not satisfactory. “The
police performance can be judged by the areas that the forces recapture and
continue dominating. But, if we see the statistics of the last four-five years,
there is no change on the ground. Despite increase in the boots on the ground,
the Maoist-dominated areas we are supposed to recapture remain elusive,” says
an IG-level officer in the affected areas.
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