Ajith is very progressive in the context of stressing
that even socialist societies did not have sufficient revolutionary democratic
development like both Russia
and China India
The Maoist Party
By Ajith
What should be the qualities of an
organisation to become the vanguard of a new society and humans, what should be
the methods of party building corresponding to this, what should be the
position of the party within the dictatorship of the proletariat? Can a
proletarian party retain its communist qualities today without becoming a
Maoist party? Is the Maoist party just another name for communist party? Or
does it contain something new, in its very nature and methods of work?
In the capitalist age, classes (or
sections within them) express and realise their interests mainly through the
instrument of political party (a social organisation). Marx posed the necessity
for the proletariat to form its own party in order to achieve its aims,
contending with enemy classes. This was developed as a scientific theory,
verified and established through practice, by Lenin. The core of the Leninist
party concept are professional revolutionaries; those who devote themselves
completely to revolutionary activity, who make this their profession. It has
been criticised that this leads to an elite who lord over the proletariat.
Further, Lenin’s viewpoint that workers cannot, on their own, arrive at the
ideology guiding their liberation, his proposition that it must be reached to
them from outside, have been remarked as a celebration of elitism. The Leninist
party concept is accused of being the concrete expression of this mindset, one
that undervalues the potential of the workers. Some argue that while the evils
of this party concept were held in check by Lenin’s personal qualities so long
as he was alive, they broke out in a monstrous death dance under Stalin.
(Pearson, Mathrubhumi - 87/3, March 29, 2009)
Let us first acquaint ourselves with
the ideological struggles that took place on this issue, during the period in
which the Leninist party concept took form. Its starting point was the debate
in the Second Congress of the undivided Russian Communist Party (then known as
the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party) on the matter of the party
constitution. The Rightists (Trotsky too was part of this) accused Lenin’s
draft statutes of promoting ultra-centralisation. Even his insistence on membership
criteria that made it mandatory to join a party committee and participate in
its practice was, in their view, an example of unwanted centralisation. Their
counter-proposal would allow anyone who helped the party be its member. They
would thus make it a loose organisation of spare-time activists. This was the
crux of the difference between Lenin and his adversaries.
Lenin clearly realised the need for
an organisation of those prepared to be frontline activists in a revolutionary
movement aimed at seizing power, those who devoted their whole lives to this
task and thus acquired the necessary leadership qualities and skills. His party
concept evolved from this vision. The specific situation in Czarist Russia,
which ruled out all open activity and made it imperative to constantly evade
the secret police, certainly was a major influencing factor in this. The weight
of such specificities can be seen in Lenin’s insistence on the total
centralisation to be enjoyed by the party’s leading body and the strict
division of tasks - almost like the division of labour in a modern factory -
among different party committees and members of the committees. But is must
also be noted that a departure from the 2nd International’s
party concept was implicit in this approach, though the immediate context it
addressed was the Russian situation. This is where Lenin separates from his
contemporaries on the party question. Leaving aside diehard Rightist attacks,
let us elaborate this by getting into the criticisms made by Rosa Luxembourg,
and also Trotsky (who was in the revolutionary camp for a while).
Lenin did not deny the voluntary
nature of party centralisation. It is not imposed, but voluntarily acceded to;
consciously taken up by all with the interests of revolution in mind. This is
Lenin’s concept of voluntary centralisation. Contrary to Luxembourg’s
‘tendency’, which must be realised through the course of struggles, for Lenin,
the methods of a centralised party, including its division of tasks, is
something to be consciously established and trained in from the very beginning.
Yet this does not negate the positiveness of revolutionary spontaneity.
To repeat, Lenin’s point of departure
was the type of organisation needed to organise and carry out revolution. He
arrived at a solution by assessing the concrete situation of the enemy and the
people, rather than starting out from some preconceived notion of revolution,
or of the proletariat and its development. Thus, during the revolutionary
upheaval of 1905, in place of the strictest centralisation and guarded
recruitment he had been favouring till then, Lenin argued for forms of
organisation capable of incorporating the greatest number of militant working
class masses. (New Tasks and New Forces,Volume 8,
pages 209-220)
This was not a case of Lenin
going against Leninism, it WAS Leninism. In this instance, he was guided by the
assessment that the revolutionary zeal of the masses, seen in that situation,
would to a large extent make up for their ideological, political weaknesses.
This displayed deep faith in the masses and a dialectical grasp of the relation
between conscious steps and spontaneity within a revolutionary movement.
Without doubt, Leninist centralisation and organisational principles are not
some absolutes meant to be implemented ‘regardless of the stage’. Its work
division does not abandon the task of raising the consciousness of the whole
party membership and the widest possible mass.
Did the later day international
communist movement loose Lenin’s exemplary, dialectical, handling of the
vanguard concept and organisational methods formulated by him? It would be far
more profitable to pay attention to such differences rather than running after
individual traits of leaders as Pearson does. Lenin was concerned about the
dangers posed by universalising Bolshevik party statutes, regardless of time
and place. In a report to the Communist International (Comintern), Lenin
observed that its organisational principles have a strong Russian flavor, and
doubted whether comrades from other countries would be able to grasp it
properly (Report to the Fourth Congress of the Communist International, Volume 33,
pages 415-432). In those days of haste to rupture from the loose
organisational methods of the 2nd International this concern
didn’t draw attention. Meanwhile, stricter centralisation was demanded of the
Russian Communist Party, which had by this time become a ruling party. The iron
unity of the party was of critical importance for the very existence of the
revolutionary state. This was the context in which the 10th Congress
of the Russian party decided to end all groups within the party and their
publications, departing from its existent practice. Later it became part of the
foundations of communist party organisational principles.
Throughout this period, Lenin, the
Russian Party and the Comintern were of the view that a revolutionary advance
was imminent in Western Europe . Political
developments in various countries testified to this. The immediacy of this
situation must certainly have influenced the formulation of organisational
principles. However, the revolutionary situation that was forming up
dissipated. At this point Lenin drew attention to the need for a thorough
evaluation in order to work out future steps, in the situation of ebb. But before
he could grapple with this he was bedridden by an assassin’s bullets and died.
It is not known whether the party concept and its organisational principles
were among the issues he had in mind for review. At any rate this is not what
was seen later. Statutes and methods of work adopted in a particular
situation were later theorised in a very mechanical manner.
Stalin’s concept of monolithic party
was prominent among his mechanical errors. This was the model followed by the
international communist movement - till it was criticised by Mao. An outlook of
worshipping the party as a power that could not be questioned and was always
correct got strengthened. The influence of mechanical thinking, which denied
internal contradictions and class struggle in socialism, was evident in
Stalin’s party concept. It was not grasped as a space of active contradictions,
as an organic entity which must continually renew its leadership position and
relevance in society by grappling with external and internal contradictions. Ideological
struggle became formal. Democratic centralism froze up into relations of
domination and subservience. As could be expected, there was a difference in
this between parties in power and those struggling for it. In the latter case,
the necessities of sustaining under enemy suppression compelled greater
reliance on the people. Self-criticism, rectification and ideological struggles
over such issues livened up the atmosphere in the party. Yet, the constrictions
of the monolithic party concept were ever present. Purging of membership gained
prominence, compared to ideological rectification. So long as the party
maintained its Marxist-Leninist orientation this usually meant removal of those
who had lost their communist qualities. But even then, ideology took a back
seat in the whole process; the organisational aspect stood out.
Mao broke away from this
negative tradition and the mechanical thinking underlying it. This was
literally a re-construction of the vanguard concept. And it opened up the way
to a deeper, richer, understanding of the proletariat’s leading role and the
Leninist party. Mao’s departure from existent thinking on the party concept can
be seen right from the very beginning. His report on the Hunan
Though other classes and social
sections will be important partners in the historical movement to destroy
capitalism (its highest stage of imperialism) they cannot provide leadership.
In each instance the issue of liberation is specific – land in the case of
landless peasants, caste oppression for Dalits, male chauvinism for women,
ethnic oppression for Adivasis, national oppression for oppressed people,
religious persecution for minorities and so on. Being specific they are also
partial, in the context of the whole revolutionary project. But this
is not the situation of the proletariat. Capitalist bondage is different from
earlier exploiting systems like caste-feudalism. It imposes no other compulsion
on the workers other than the pangs of hunger. And since, in principle, they
are free, there can be no specific liberation suiting them. Every form of
exploitation and oppression must be ended. Thus the emancipation of the whole
of humanity becomes a precondition for the liberation of this class. The
leading role of the proletariat derives from this objective social position. It
obliges the proletariat to continue the revolution all the way up till
realising a world rid of exploitation.
If this Marxist understanding of
proletarian leadership is absolutised it would certainly lead to reification.
(Sandeepan, Munnaniporali, 131) Both the history and present of the
international communist movement illustrate how this emerges with mechanical
equations, where proletariat = revolution and communist party = vanguard. On
the other hand, economist impulses often seen in the upper strata of the
proletariat, social passivity engendered by revisionist, reformist politics
that strengthen this economism, and changes seen in the nature of labour and
work places, have given rise to views that abandon the proletarian leadership
concept. Carried away in the tide of identity politics, they believe that, in
future, these movements will give leadership to social change.
Thus we have the two. At one end,
reification of the proletariat and the communist party, selfishness that hoists
this banner to justify fleeting necessities as common interests. At
the other, the lethargic plea to reduce our sights to the partial, to abandon
the noble task of an exploitation free world since it is a mere myth. Maoism
cuts through this vicious circle. The leading role of the proletariat and the
vanguard position of its communist party are potentialities contained in
historical circumstances. They can only be realised through creative
intervention in the historical moment of a specific society. Similar to other
phenomena, this too is a unity of opposites. This was the import of Mao’s
warning in the Hunan
One sees the continuity with this in
Mao’s observation, made some 50 years later, “the bourgeoisie is within the
party itself”. He arrived at this conclusion through the experiences of the
restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union and the Cultural Revolution
unleashed in China
This poses yet another dialectic of
the communist party’s position as vanguard. The main source of the potential
hazard we saw above does not lie with external influences. It is contained in
the revolution it led, in the society thus created, in other words, in the
emergent unity of opposites brought up by its successful venture of being a
vanguard. This potential is the mirror opposite of that of leading the advance
to communism. Which of them will be realised in a given socialist society is a
matter to be settled by the class struggle taking place within the party and
society in each concrete historical moment. Grasping the party as a unity of
opposites - this is the point of rupture to firmly establish the Maoist party
concept in both theory and practice.
Taking lessons from the Chinese
revolution and the international communist movement Mao elaborated a number of
propositions on the party. One theme consistently stressed throughout is that
of firmly building up the communist consciousness of serving the people, by
checking attitudes of superiority in the relations between the party and the
people, and leadership and ranks. This does not deny the role or importance of
leadership. Mao was contradicting an outlook that absolutised leadership, and
made the masses and ranks into disciples, passive instruments. He reminded
communists that no matter how necessary cadres are, it is the masses that carry
out things and therefore it wouldn’t do to exaggerate the role of cadres. He persists
with this in the relation between the central committee and lower committees
and that between the socialist state and the people. In the absence of
information from the lower levels the central leadership cannot arrive at
correct decisions. At times a solution may be arrived at in the lower level
itself, in which case the task of the central committee is to propagate this
throughout the country. Such observations of Mao topple any idea of infallible
leadership. They also helped in bringing out the relation between the
organisation principle of democratic centralism and the Marxist theory of
knowledge. Mao pointed out that the struggle against the bourgeoisie was not
the only element in class struggle under socialism. It included contradictions
between the socialist state and people, and between the party and the people.
Right in the 1950s itself he warned that the people would teach those who
thought they could lord over them, now that power was seized. He advocated the
right of the people to strike and protest saying that the communist party needs
to learn a lesson. (‘Combat Bourgeois Ideas in the Party’, ‘Speech at the
Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party
of China
What is striking here is the
importance he placed on struggle from below, the spontaneous initiative of the
people. This grasp of the dialectical relation between conscious intervention
from above and spontaneous pressure from below, this Leninist understanding
lost by the international communist movement in the interregnum, was not just
retaken by Mao. He took it to a new height by applying it in the Cultural
Revolution, in the struggle against the danger of capitalist restoration. Mao
thus developed the party concept and established it on new foundations; not on
some individual behavioural traits, but solid ideological-political principles.
To what extent could the Communist
Party of China led by Mao imbibe this newness? This is a relevant question. It
serves as an entry for assessing the extent to which the international movement
that emerged in the 1960s inspired by Mao Tsetung Thought, or the Maoists who
laid claim to deeper clarity in the 1990s, have incorporated and actualised the
Maoist party concept. The Chinese party was forged in the Cominternist mould.
This aspect, as well as its background of having functioned for long with its
methods and style, must be kept in mind while seeking an answer to our
question. As we noted, Mao had started to break away from this model from the
very beginning. But his new approach would really be established only through
the Cultural Revolution. In fact, Mao’s teachings on the party were
systematically compiled only in 1973, in the Shanghai
But it wouldn’t be enough to mark
this limit imposed by conditions. There is also the matter of an incomplete
rupture from the Comintern approach. Among them, the cult built up around Mao
deserves special attention. This business of personality cult was initiated by
Stalin in total opposition to Lenin’s outlook. When the then Soviet leader
Khrushchev prepared ideological grounds for capitalist restoration by negating
Stalin totally, under the guise of rejecting this cult, Mao took up the defence
of Stalin. But this was done with Marxist criticism on Stalin’s errors,
differentiating between what is to be adopted and what rejected. We need to
think over whether this was complete. Personality cults can never be justified
in Marxism. But instead of totally rejecting them Mao limited himself to
criticising their extreme manifestations. Though this is sought to be justified
by appealing to the complex situation of the class struggle in China
In general, how far have the Maoists
succeeded in rupturing from the Cominternist party concept? How much Maoist are
the parties they are building up and leading? Though no one would theorise, and
thus legitimise, a shift from staying with the masses and serving them to
lording over them, this can already be seen in a number of instances. Blind
faith in the party in the place of party loyalty centered on politics, blind
belief in the infallibility of the leadership and cult worship, intolerance of
opposition and criticism, pragmatism that sanctions any method if they are “for
the party and revolution” – such Cominternist influences are commonly seen in
methods of work and approach. The term Cominternist is used because these were
not errors of Stalin alone. Moreover, they contain problems of a whole period
in the history of the international communist movement. We must add, there were
problems of outlook and growth. Because this was a time in
which communist ideology was spread throughout the world, formation of
communist parties was promoted, and a truly international revolutionary
proletarian movement was given form to. One of the great leaps achieved by
Maoism is its rupture from bad traditions of the Comintern period, without in
the least minimising its positive role. This must be further deepened. Today’s
Maoist parties are, without doubt, continuators of yesteryear communist
parties. But their foundations must be the heights attained by Maoism in the
vanguard concept, not the outlook or methods of their past.
No comments:
Post a Comment